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Default rates on instalment loans vary with type of the good purchased.
Using an Italian dataset of instalment loans between 1995-1999, we ¯rst
show that the variation persists even after controlling for contract and
individual-speci¯c characteristics, and for the potential selection bias
due to credit rationing. We explore whether the residual variation in
the default rates across the di®erent types of goods is due to unobserved
individual heterogeneity (selection e®ect) or due to the e®ect of the
speci¯c characteristics of the good (good e®ect). We claim that the
two e®ects may be interpreted as adverse selection and moral hazard.
We exploit the data on multiple contracts per individual to disentangle
the two e®ects, and ¯nd that most of the variation is explained by the
selection e®ect. Individuals who buy motorcycles on credit are more
likely to default on any loan, while those buying kitchen appliances,
furniture and computers are more likely to repay, compared to average.
We conclude that there is asymmetric information in the consumer
credit market, mostly in the form of adverse selection.
Keywords: consumer credit, default, adverse selection, moral hazard
JEL classi¯cation: D12, D14, D82
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Why should a loan to buy a fridge be repaid more often than a loan to buy
a motorcycle? It has been observed that similar instalment loans which ¯-
nance purchases of di®erent types of goods di®er in the incidence of default.
Table 1, which summarizes the repayment behavior on borrowers' ¯rst con-
tracts with Findomestic Banca over the period 1995-1999, shows there is
considerable variation among the default rates of loans ¯nancing di®erent
goods. Mobile phones, motorcycles and used cars are repaid least often,
while furniture, kitchen appliances and new cars are at the other end of the
repayment spectrum. The observed default rates range from 10 % to 2 %.
We ¯rst show that the di®erences persist even after controlling for numerous
contract-speci¯c and consumer-speci¯c factors, as well as for the potential
selection bias due to the fact that default is observed only for those loan
applications that have been accepted.
The remaining variation in default rates across goods, conditional on
the observable borrower and contract characteristics and on the acceptance
decision, can be driven by two alternative mechanisms, the selection e®ect
and the good e®ect. The selection e®ect suggests that people who are more
prone to defaulting are more likely to buy on credit certain goods such as
motorcycles or mobile phones rather than other goods, while people who
typically repay their loans are more likely to buy other types of goods on
credit. The resulting variation in the default probability is then due to the
unobserved individual heterogeneity and the selection of individuals with
di®erent repayment behavior to di®erent types of goods. The variation in
the default rates across di®erent goods' categories then simply re°ects the
variation in the average level of repayment behavior among people buying
speci¯c type of goods on credit.1
On the other hand, the good e®ect may be present even when individuals
are homogenous in their default inclinations, and suggests that it is the
speci¯c features of the good that a®ect the incentives to repay, such as high
depreciation rate or low penalty for defaulting.
The aim of this paper is to bring evidence on which of the two mecha-
nisms, whether the selection or the good e®ect, stand behind the observed
variation in the default rates, and if both, which is not unlikely, which of
the two dominates. Is it the speci¯c features of the good, or rather the spe-
ci¯c features of the individuals who buy the good, that explain the observed
1 The present analysis considers only credit ¯nanced purchases of the goods. Con-
sumer's choice whether to buy a good on credit or not, and which types of goods to buy
on credit, is likely to be relevant but disregarded here due to data limitations.
1Table 1: Default Rates per Good - Ranked in Ascending Order
Type of the Good Default
New Cars and Motor Homes 2.22%




Electr. Equipment (Brown Goods) 6.08%
(Used) Cars and Motor Homes 6.64%
Motorbikes 6.90%
Telecommunication 10.06%
Source: Findomestic data, individuals' ¯rst instalment loans, 1995-1999.
di®erences in the default rates? For example, is it the case that people who
tend to not repay their debts buy motorcycles on credit more often, or is it
something about the motorcycles which makes their owners to not repay?
We claim that, in the context of the contract theory, the two e®ects may
be interpreted as adverse selection and moral hazard. In this sense, the pa-
per brings further evidence on whether there is asymmetric information in
the consumer credit market, and shows whether it is in the form of adverse
selection or in the form of moral hazard.
We use an administrative dataset of instalment loan contracts of a lead-
ing Italian bank (Findomestic Banca) between 1995-1999 to estimate a
model of the probability of default. Multiple contracts per individual are
observed, which allows us to disentangle the selection e®ect from the good
e®ect. We use information about rejected applications to control for the
potential bias due to the fact that default is observed only for those loan
applications that have been accepted.
We ¯nd that most of the residual variation in default rates across the
di®erent goods, after controlling for the observable borrower and contract
characteristics and for the acceptance decision, is due to unobserved in-
dividual heterogeneity and the selection e®ect. Our results suggest that
individuals who buy motorcycles are more likely than an average person
to default on any type of loan. On the other hand, individuals who buy
kitchen appliances, furniture and computers are less likely to default on
their loans compared to the average. New cars and mobile phones are two
types of goods where the good e®ect seems to matter as well, reducing the
repayment probability in the earlier case and increasing it in the latter.
2We conclude that there is asymmetric information in the consumer credit
market in Italy, and most of it is in the form of adverse selection. Given
that the contract terms vary only with the goods but not with individuals,
the results suggest that the repaying individuals, when they buy a good
that has a high average default rate, cross-subsidize those who don't repay.
We propose that conditions of the loan should not depend only on the type
of the good being purchased but also on the goods-related type of the in-
dividual who applies for the loan. The information about types of goods
¯nanced through previous loan applications may be used by credit-granting
companies to help assess the risk of default.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the two
e®ects and shows their econometric counterparts. We then present the es-
timation methodology, followed by the description of the data. The section
with the main results comes next. Finally, we explore the sensitivity of our
results and conclude. The Appendix contains de¯nitions of variables, full
estimation results, and results of the sensitivity analysis.
2 Selection E®ect versus Good E®ect
The focus of this paper is the variation in default rates across di®erent types
of goods. Table 2 shows that Findomestic Banca, the lender who provided
us with the data, is aware of this variation and translates it into both the
interest rates charged on loans for di®erent types of goods, as well as into
the acceptance decision rules applied to loan applications for di®erent types
of goods. Although the relationship between the observed unconditional
default rates, the acceptance rates and the average levels of interest rates is
not perfectly monotonic, as other factors come into play as well, it is clear
that applications for loans to ¯nance the goods that have higher default
rates have typically higher interest rates and are rejected more often. The
features of the contracts in our data do not vary with individuals. The
conditions of the loan are posted next to the good that is o®ered to be
bought on credit. Acceptance decisions, on the other hand, are based on
the individual characteristics of the applicant, but also vary with contract
types and with the type of the good purchased on credit.
In this paper, we do not model lender's behavior. We consider the condi-
tions of the contracts and the acceptance strategy as a particular equilibrium
outcome. It is the \residual" cross-good variation in the default rates that
we are interested in. The aim of this paper is to explain the variation in
the default rates across loans for di®erent types of goods, which remains
3Table 2: Default, Acceptance Rates, Interest Rates
Type of the Good Default Accepted IRR
New Cars and motor homes 2.22% 78.8% 13.5%
White Goods (kitchen appliances) 3.69% 88.5% 28.9%
Furniture 3.75% 86.8% 20.2%
Computers 3.79% 86.6% 22.0%
Other 4.79% 80.4% 23.3%
Electr. equipment (Brown Goods) 6.08% 83.2% 27.7%
(Used) Cars and motor homes 6.64% 64.6% 17.5%
Motorbikes 6.90% 75.1% 20.3%
Telecommunication 10.06% 78.1% 28.9%
Source: Findomestic data, individuals' ¯rst instalment loans, 1995-1999.
after we control for the individual and contract-speci¯c characteristics and
the acceptance decision. In particular, we explore whether this variation is
caused by the selection e®ect or the good e®ect. In the ¯rst case, the varia-
tion is driven by the unobserved individual heterogeneity in the propensity
to default, which is correlated with the type of the good purchased on credit.
In the second, the variation directly re°ects the \causal" good e®ect, i.e. the
e®ect of the features of the good purchased on credit on the incentives to
repay.
The main question may be phrased as follows: Is it the speci¯c unob-
served features of the individuals who buy the good, or rather the speci¯c
features of the good itself, that explain the observed di®erences in the de-
fault rates? Our objective is to disentangle the two e®ects, without giving
an explicit interpretation as to how they work. However, we do summarize
our conjectures about the two types of mechanisms next and will invoke
them again when interpreting our results.
Certain types of products, such as motorcycles, may be preferred by
risk-loving individuals, who also tend to repay their loans less often on av-
erage. Other types of goods, such as household equipment, are likely to be
purchased by more risk-averse individuals, those who have or are about to
start a family, who are home owners etc., and who tend to repay their debts,
compared to the average. The risk-association of particular types of goods
and the positive correlation between risk aversion and repayment behavior
may establish the observed variation in the default rate, as caused purely
by the selection e®ect.
As for the good e®ect, two types of the good's characteristics may have
4impact on the repayment incentives. The ¯rst is related to the extent and
duration of the utility the good brings to the consumer, as re°ected by
the rate with which the good depreciates. This may be given either by
technical features of the good - its lifetime and how easily it breaks down,
or to changes in preferences - especially in the case of goods that are highly
subject to fashion. High depreciation rate of the good is likely to reduce
the incentives of its owner to repay it. The second feature is related to
the cost of default, namely the probability of punishment - the likelihood
that the good, if not repaid, will be repossessed by the lender. The size
and mobility of the good determine how easily it can be repossessed, while
the existence and e±ciency of a second-hand market for the good a®ect the
incentives of the lender to repossess it or not. A new car is an example of
the good that can be easily identi¯ed (due to compulsory car registration)
and repossessed, and at the same time is worth repossessing, as it can be
immediately transformed into money on the used-car market.
There is both theoretical and empirical research on the optimal repay-
ment decision. Papers like Wang and White (2000) study the decision to
¯le for a bankruptcy, other papers consider the decision to default on a par-
ticular loan. However, to our knowledge, none of them links the decision
to default on an instalment loan to the kind of the good that has been ¯-
nanced by that loan. There are a few exceptions that mention the features
of the good or its market as important. Iossa and Palumbo (2003, 2004)
suggest that a default on the instalment loan when the product is defective
establishes incentives for ¯nance institutions to share product-failure re-
sponsibility. The authors show that such lender liability in consumer credit
transactions helps to prevent market failure due to informational asymmetry
between sellers and buyers about the product's quality.
There is a growing empirical research that tests whether there is asym-
metric information in various consumer markets. See Chiappori and Salani¶ e
(2003) for an overview. We claim that the two alternative explanations of
the residual variation in the default rates across di®erent types of goods,
the selection e®ect and the good e®ect, may be interpreted as adverse se-
lection and moral hazard. In this respect, the present paper extends this
literature by providing evidence on the existence and the particular form of
the asymmetric information in the consumer credit market.
2.1 Econometric Speci¯cation of the Problem
An individual applies for an instalment loan to purchase a certain type of the
good and his application is accepted. His repayment behavior is assumed
5to follow Equation 1. D¤
ij is the propensity of an individual i to default on
contract j, where only an indicator Dij = 1(D¤
ij > 0), whether the contract
has been defaulted or not, is observed. Each contract ¯nances a purchase of
a particular type of the good k, and there are K types of the goods.
D¤




ij + ¹i + "ij (1)
Xi is vector of individual-speci¯c characteristics
Zj is vector of contract-speci¯c characteristics2
Gk
ij is an indicator for the type of the good purchased, G
(k)
ij = 1 if good




¹i is unobservable individual-speci¯c heterogeneity
"ij is an error term, uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, as well as
uncorrelated with ¹i
The Gk
ij indicators are the good ¯xed e®ects, and capture any non-random
unobserved heterogeneity which is good-speci¯c. There are no contract ¯xed
e®ects, as all other contract related terms are observed. Equation 1 allows
us to de¯ne the two potential sources of the unexplained variation in the
default rates across di®erent types of goods (the selection e®ect and the
good e®ect) in econometric terms.
If there is no unobserved individual heterogeneity in the propensity to
default, or if it is uncorrelated with the type of the good being purchased,
E(¹i=Gk
ij) = E(¹i) for all k, the unexplained residual variation in the default
rates across di®erent types of the goods is driven by the good e®ect, i.e. the
e®ect of the good-speci¯c characteristics on repayment behavior. Namely,
Gk
ij 6= 0 for at least some k.
On the other hand, if Gk
ij = 0 for all k, there are no true good e®ects
and the residual variation in the default rates across di®erent types of goods
is driven by the selection e®ect. Namely, it implies that the unobserved in-
dividual heterogeneity ¹i is not distributed randomly across di®erent types
2 As in our data, contract characteristics are not person speci¯c. The terms of the
contract are posted next to the good to be purchased.
6of goods, so that E(¹i=Gk
ij) 6= E(¹i) for at least some k. In words, individ-
uals with di®erent levels of the unobserved component of the propensity to
default sort themselves to buy di®erent types of goods.
There are many applications in empirical economic research, in labor
economics in particular, that try to distinguish a true causal e®ect of a
particular variable from the selection e®ect due to unobserved individual
heterogeneity that is correlated with this variable. To do this typically
requires panel data. If multiple contracts per individual are observed, we
can control for the unobserved individual heterogeneity ¹i in Equation 1
with individual ¯xed e®ects, and therefore directly estimate the true good
e®ects Gk
ij, and test whether they are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
However, attrition is endogenous here, and the extent of the bias is sub-
stantial. In particular, even if people who defaulted on their ¯rst contract
still decide to apply for another contract, which is unlikely, the probability
that the application will be accepted and the repayment behavior for that
contract will be observed is very small. It is far from obvious how to model
the selection process, where the current behavior determines whether a sub-
sequent contract is observed.3 This procedure imposes many distributional
assumptions and requires rich enough data to give reliable estimates.
Although we have information on multiple contract applications and
multiple contracts per individual in our data, the timing of the sequence
of the contracts, of their repayment evaluation, and of the subsequent con-
tract's acceptance decision is imprecise.4 At the same time, to answer our
question about whether the selection e®ect or the good e®ect dominates the
unexplained cross-good variation in default rates, does not necessarily re-
quire to control for the general individual speci¯c heterogeneity component
¹i (provided it is uncorrelated with explanatory variables in the model other
than the good-speci¯c dummy variables). As will be explained shortly, to
avoid endogenous attrition as well as the assumptions it imposes on the data,
we choose to estimate Equation 1 only on individuals' ¯rst contracts, while
using the information about the goods ¯nanced by the current as well as
subsequent accepted and rejected applications to capture the goods-related
part of the individual heterogeneity.
3 The set-up is similar to dynamic panel data models with endogenous attrition.
4 Namely, it is not clear when the repayment behavior on current contract is observed
in relation to the acceptance decision on the future contract.
73 Estimation Methods - Three Models
This section describes the three empirical models we estimate. So far, we
have only presented (in Table 1) the unconditional variation in the default
probability across di®erent goods. The ¯rst question to ask is whether this
variation is still present even after controlling for the observable individ-
ual and contract-speci¯c characteristics, and when taking into account the
potential selection bias due to the fact that repayment behavior is only ob-
served for the accepted loan applications. We therefore estimate Model I,
in which the probability of default is a function of the individual-speci¯c
and contract-speci¯c variables, using the accepted ¯rst loan applications of
the individuals in our sample. We then add to Model I a selection equation
for the acceptance decision, and estimate Model II, using both the accepted
and the rejected ¯rst loan applications.
In both models, we include the binary indicators for the type of the
good purchased. These good-speci¯c dummy variables capture any potential
cross-good variation of the default probability that is not explained by the
observed characteristics, and/or by the selection bias due to credit rationing.
3.1 Model I
In Model I, we estimate a simple binary model of the default probability,
as described by Equation 2, using only the accepted ¯rst loan applications
of the individuals in our sample, to avoid the endogenous attrition in the
composition of the subsequent accepted loan applications.
The propensity to default is estimated by a simple probit model as follows
D¤




ij + !ij (2)
where
Xi includes functions of individual characteristics such as gender, age, mar-
ital status, number of children, disposable income, employment status,
job tenure, home ownership, renting, tenure with the bank, and geo-
graphic indicators for the province of residence
Zj includes functions of contract characteristics such as length of the con-
tract, size of the loan, interest rate (internal rate of return), price of
the good purchased, loan insurance, means of payments, the dealer of
the good, whether dealer pays the interest rate, etc.
8!ij is a composite error term, assumed to follow normal distribution and to
be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables
The estimated good-speci¯c dummy variables ^ Gk
ij capture the residual dif-
ferences in the propensity to default across di®erent types of goods, i.e.
di®erences that are unexplained by the model.
The main objectives of the estimation of Model I is to show whether the
observed unconditional variation in the default rates across di®erent types
of goods persist even after controlling for all the observable individual and
contract-speci¯c characteristics Xi and Zj.
3.2 Model II
Even in the absence of unobserved individual heterogeneity, estimation of
Model I is subject to a selection bias due to censoring, as not all ¯rst ap-
plications are accepted and there may be a systematic di®erence between
the repayment behavior on contracts that were accepted, compared to the
repayment behavior on the rejected contracts had they been accepted, which
may distort the estimation results.
In addition, as shown in Table 2, acceptance rates also vary across dif-
ferent types of goods which may further bias the estimated good-speci¯c
dummy variables. We take this potential selection into account in Model II.
The default probability is estimated on the subset of the accepted ¯rst loan
applications, while the rejected ¯rst applications are used to correct for the
selection bias due to credit rationing. In Model II, we use an equation for
D¤
ij, the propensity of an individual i to default on a loan j, that is identical
to Model I, and add a second equation for Y ¤
ij, a latent index that determines
bank's decision whether to accept an application of an individual i for loan
j or not. Model II is described as follows
D¤




ij + !ij and Dij = 1(D¤
ij > 0)
Y ¤
ij = W± + uij and Yij = 1(y¤
ij > 0)
Dij is observed i® Yij = 1
W ¾ Xi;Zj and the Gk
ij indicators5
!ij and uij are assumed to be jointly normally distributed
5 As date of birth is missing for the rejected loan applications, age is not included in
the acceptance decision equation. In addition, indicators for an agency (bank's branch)
9Given the distributional assumptions, the system of the two equations
corresponds to the bivariate probit model with censoring,6 and is estimated
jointly by maximum likelihood. The identi¯cation requires at least one ex-
clusion restriction, a variable present in the selection equation but excluded
from the equation for the default probability.
We follow Alessie et al. (2005) in our choice of the exclusion restrictions.
The advantage of the data at hand is that it spans over a period during
which so called Usury Law was enacted in Italy, a reform that put ceilings
on the interest rates on certain consumer loans. It is likely that this policy
measure had an impact on both the interest rates, as well as the degree of
credit rationing in case of the loans that were a®ected by the reform.
More speci¯cally, the exclusion restriction that we use to estimate Model
II is a dummy variable that indicates whether the contract started before
this so-called Usury Law reform came into e®ect (the beginning of 1997) or
after. However, the interest rates typically vary with the size of the loan,
so that loans of di®erent sizes have been a®ected unequally.7 We therefore
interact the Usury Law dummy variable with the size of the loan and the
size of the loan squared, to be able to capture this variation.
Using this reform as an exclusion restriction, we assume that while the
reform had an impact on the interest rates and the acceptance decisions, it
had no direct impact on the default behavior. In other words, we claim that
once we control for the acceptance decision and condition on the interest rate
and other variables in the model, the reform has not altered the propensity
to default. The validity of the exclusion restriction therefore hinges on the
assumption that any e®ect of the law on the individuals' default behavior
is channeled solely through the interest rate, and through the change in the
pool of the accepted applications, two factors that are both controlled for
in the model.
Model II is estimated on all ¯rst loan applications. It controls for the
potential selection bias due to credit rationing (using rejected applications)
but ignores any unobserved individual heterogeneity that would be corre-
lated with the type of the good being ¯nanced. We estimate Model II to
¯nd out whether the observed variation in the default rates across di®erent
that administers the loans are used instead of the indicators for the province of residence
in the acceptance decision equation. The two are highly correlated, and only one set can
be in each of the equations. While place of residence is likely to matter more for default
behavior, the agency ¯xed e®ect is crucial for the acceptance decision they make.
6 As described for example in Greene (2003).
7 In addition, the interest rate ceilings imposed by the reform also vary for three
categories of instalment loans, as given by its size.
10types of the goods persists even when the potential selection bias due to the
fact that default is observed only for the accepted applications, is taken into
account. The statistical signi¯cance of the good-speci¯c dummy variables
^ Gk
ij reveals whether this is still the case.
3.3 Model III - Preferred Model
As has been pointed out, the good-speci¯c dummy variables ^ Gk
ij in the equa-
tion of the probability of default, estimated by Model I and Model II using
the cross-sectional data of the accepted ¯rst loan applications, capture the
residual cross-good variation in default rates. If we ¯nd that the estimated
^ Gk
ij are statistically signi¯cant, we conclude that the variation in the de-
fault probability across di®erent types of goods is still present, even after
controlling for the observed characteristics and for the potential selection
bias due to credit rationing. However, we cannot say anything about what
drives this residual variation. ^ Gk
ij represent a reduced-form estimates of this
variation, which brings no evidence on its source. Namely, the estimates
of the good-speci¯c dummy variables ^ Gk
ij, if statistically signi¯cant, may
be interpreted either as the selection e®ect or the good e®ect. In the ¯rst
case, it captures the mean value of the unobserved individual propensity to
default of individuals buying di®erent types of the good,8 in the second, it
simple estimates the true good e®ects Gk
ij.9
If we ¯nd that the residual variation is still present, we next explore what
is its cause. Is it the selection e®ect, due to the unobserved individual het-
erogeneity in the propensity to default that is correlated with the type of the
goods individuals buy on credit, or is it the causal e®ect of the good itself?
Neither Model I or Model II can answer this question. To show whether it
is the selection e®ect or the good e®ect what drives the residual variation,




8 For illustration, lets imagine that the unobserved individual heterogeneity component
in the propensity to default varies only with the type of the good purchased but is un-
correlated with the rest of the explanatory variables, e.g. ¹i = ¹
k + ºi, where ºi is an
iid error term. The good-speci¯c dummy variables, ^ G
k
ij, would simply estimate ¹
k, the
average levels of ¹i in di®erent goods' categories.
9 If there is no unobservable individual heterogeneity (¹i) in the default behavior, or if
this heterogeneity is distributed randomly across the goods that the individuals buy and
¯nance through credit (namely E(¹i=k) = E(¹i) and ¹i is independent of the explanatory
variables), the estimated good-speci¯c dummy variables can be interpreted structurally
as the \causal" good e®ects, i.e. an e®ect the particular good has on the individuals'
repayment behavior.
11Model III is identical to Model II except for the goods-type related in-
dividual heterogeneity indicators Tk
i , constructed from the multiple loan
applications and included in the equation of the propensity to default.
D¤








i + "ij and Dij = 1(D¤
ij > 0)
Y ¤
ij = W± + uij and Yij = 1(y¤
ij > 0)
Dij is observed i® Yij = 1
"ij and uij are assumed to be jointly normally distributed
W ¾ Xi;Zj and the Gk
ij indicators and the exclusion restriction: Usury Law
indicator and its interaction with the loan size and the squared loan
size
The goods-type related indicators Tk
i are based on all the loan applications,
¯rst and subsequent, regardless whether accepted or rejected, observed for
each individual in the sample. They are constructed as follows: Tk
i = 1 if
at least one of the credit applications, accepted or rejected, was to ¯nance
a good of the type k, and Tk
i = 0 otherwise.
The number of di®erent goods applied for, as well as their mixture vary
across individuals. As there are K types of goods observed, there are K
indicators constructed and included in the default equation to capture the
part of ¹i that is correlated with the type of the good.
The above described method controls for any goods-related unobserved
time-invariant individual heterogeneity ¹k
i through a certain kind of con-
structed ¯xed e®ects. It does however capture only the goods-related indi-
vidual heterogeneity, and it still makes an assumption about the remaining
unobserved individual heterogeneity to be randomly distributed across in-
dividuals and goods, and to be uncorrelated with the other explanatory
variables.
Similar to Model II, we estimate Model III as a bivariate probit model
with censoring by maximum likelihood. It is estimated on the ¯rst loan
applications, using rejected applications to control for the potential selection
bias due to credit rationing. We exploit the multiple loan applications by the
same individual to construct the goods-type related indicators Tk
i in order
to control for the unobserved individual heterogeneity in the propensity to
default, which is correlated with the type of the good purchased on credit.
As Model III controls for the individual heterogeneity related to type of
12goods purchased, the estimated good-speci¯c dummy variables ^ Gk
ij re°ect
the true good e®ect, while the estimated goods-type related indicators ^ Tk
i
capture the goods-related individual heterogeneity, i.e. the selection e®ect.
4 Data
The data used in this paper comprises both accepted and rejected loan appli-
cations for instalment credit with Findomestic Banca, a major Italian bank
which specializes in ¯nancing consumer durable goods. The dataset is a
cross-sectional snapshot of contracts, containing contract features, borrower
characteristics, as well as indicators of repayment behavior for the accepted
contracts. The loans are not collateralized but if they are not repaid, con-
tracts are sold to third parties, i.e. collecting agencies. Each borrower may
have several contracts. All current and past contracts and applications of
the sample of borrowers are observed up to 1999, the year of extraction of
the data. The sampling has been performed randomly on a borrower level.
The observed contracts and applications span over the period 1995-1999.
In total, there are 75,447 accepted ¯rst loan applications and 16,024 re-
jected ¯rst applications in the data used for the estimation. Table 3 presents
the means of the key variables for the sample of the accepted ¯rst loan ap-
plications that is used for the estiamtion of the propensity to default. See
Alessie et al.(2005) for a detailed description of the data and the discussion
to what extent it is representative of Italian population.
The key factor of the repayment behavior that this paper is interested
in is the type of the good being purchased on credit. We construct nine
categories of the goods, based on the information about the good ¯nanced
through a particular contract. Table 4 shows the distribution of the contracts
in our sample (the accepted ¯rst loan applications) across the nine di®erent
types of goods. Both proportions and the absolute sample size for the nine
good categories are presented.
5 Results
We next discuss the results from the estimation of the three models described
above. As the nine good-speci¯c dummy variables add to one, one of the
good types is excluded as a base category. We choose the category titled
\Other", which ranks in the middle according to the unconditional default
rates compared across the good categories and more or less corresponds to
the average default rate in the sample, to be excluded. The e®ect of the good
13Table 3: Summary Statistics - Accepted First Loan Applications
Variable Mean Variable Mean
Default 0.06
Female 0.27 Interest rate (IRR) 17%
Age 39.5 Size of the loan 1,397¤
Married 0.64 Maturity of the loan 12.4
Num. of kids 0.87 Price of the good 1,955¤
Profession tenure 8.6 Contract insured 0.19
Hownownership 0.48 Buyer pays interest 0.62
Mortgage 0.04 Dealer pays interest 0.36
Household Income 15,200¤ Payment by bank 0.31





¤ in EUR, de°ated to year 2000 values
De¯nitions of the variables are presented in the Appendix.
Table 4: Distribution of Accepted First Loans Across the Type of Goods
Type of the Good % of individuals N of Individuals
New Cars and Motor Homes 2.2% 3,745
(Used) Cars and Motor Homes 6.9% 2,088
Motorbikes 6.6% 9,178
Electr. Equipment (Brown Goods) 6.1% 26,069
Computers 3.8% 2,978





14on the probability of the default is therefore always measured relative to
the category Other. The estimated good-speci¯c dummy variables capture
the residual cross-good variation as follows: if the coe±cient of the dummy
variable for a particular good category is statistically signi¯cant and positive,
it means that the propensity to default on that particular good is higher than
the average default rate.
As discussed in the introduction, the unconditional tabulation of the
default rates across di®erent types of goods, as shown in Table 1, suggests
that mobile phones, motorcycles, used cars and electrical appliances are
typically repaid least often, while furniture, kitchen goods and especially
new cars have the lowest default rates. When we list the estimated good-
speci¯c dummy variables, we present the estimates for the di®erent types
of goods in the order given by the ranking of their unconditional default
rates, starting from the lowest to the highest. In this way, it is easy to
see both whether the order of the goods' contributions to the propensity to
default corresponds to the unconditional cross-good variation in the default,
as well as whether a particular good has above or below-average e®ect on the
default. As the main focus of the paper is the residual cross-good variation
in the default rates, only the estimates of the goods-related variables (good-
speci¯c dummy variables ^ Gk
ij and the goods-type individual heterogeneity
indicators ^ Tk
i ) are presented here. The impact of the di®erent types of goods
and the impact of the goods-type individual heterogeneity on the probability
of default are expressed in terms of marginal e®ects. The list of the other
explanatory variables that we condition on, as well as the full estimation
results can be found in Appendix.
Most of the estimated e®ects of the individual and the contract-speci¯c
characteristics are stable across the three models and in line with prior
expectations. As for the individual level characteristics, marital status, job
tenure, disposable income, home ownership, having a mortgage, being a
public employee, and being a client of the bank prior to 1990 decrease the
probability of default, while self-employment status as well as the number of
children increase it. In terms of the contract features, interest rate, size of the
loan, as well as its length increase the probability of default, while price of the
good, contract insurance, and payments by bank rather than postal orders
reduce it. The exclusion restrictions in the acceptance decision equation -
the Usury Law enactment, a dummy variable that indicates that the contract
application originates from the period prior to the reform, also interacted
with the size of the loan and the size of the loan squared - are all signi¯cant.
The coe±cients suggest that, controlling for any other factors, including the
15year dummy variables for the start of the contract, the acceptance rates
fell after the reform, but less so for the bigger loans. This suggest that, in
response to the reform and given the default probabilities, the bank tries to
maintain the same expected return from credit, by making the rules stricter
in cases where the interest rates had to be lowered below the legal limit. The
estimates also con¯rm the di®ering e®ect of the law by the size of the loan.
Table 5 presents the marginal e®ects of the good-speci¯c dummy variables
^ Gk
i , estimated by Model I and Model II. The standard errors are given in
parenthesis.
Table 5: Results Model I and Model II
Model I Model II
New Cars -0.022¤¤ (0.002) -0.022¤¤ (0.003)
Kitchen Appl. 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
Furniture -0.008¤¤ (0.003) -0.008¤¤ (0.003)
Computers -0.001 (0.004) 0.000 (0.004)
Electrical Eq. 0.013¤¤ (0.003) 0.013¤¤ (0.003)
Used Cars 0.000 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005)
Motorbikes 0.006¤ (0.003) 0.006¤ (0.003)
Mobile Phones 0.030¤¤ (0.004) 0.030¤¤ (0.004)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Other is the Base Category. Ordered by unconditional default rates.
It is apparent that the results from Model I and Model II are almost
identical and reach the same conclusions in all relevant aspects. This means
that despite the fact that the estimated correlation between the residuals in
the acceptance decision and the default equation is positive and statistically
signi¯cant, the selection bias for the good indicators is negligible.
The results in Table 5 show that even when we condition on the key
individual-speci¯c and contract-speci¯c factors, as in Model I, and also con-
trol for the potential selection bias due to credit rationing, the variation of
the default rates across di®erent types of goods is still present. This varia-
tion is captured by the signi¯cance of the marginal e®ects of the goods on
the default probability - whether they are statistically signi¯cant from the
base category, and therefore also from average and from each other. The
results suggest that only ¯ve categories of goods are signi¯cantly di®erent
from the base category: Mobile phones, electrical equipment and motor-
16cycles are repaid less often than average, while new cars and furniture are
repaid more often than average.
When we compare the ranking of the goods by the unconditional default
rates, as given by the order in which their are presented, with the ranking
given by the signs and the magnitudes of the estimated marginal e®ects, we
see that the ordering of the goods according to their e®ect on the probability
of default is more or less preserved. There are, however, three exceptions.
Kitchen appliances are ranked at a higher and used cars at a lower level
than before, i.e. closer to the average from which they are both statistically
undistinguishable, suggesting that selection on observable characteristics of
the contracts and the borrowers drives part of the rather low and rather high
unconditional default rates in these two cases. On the other hand, electrical
equipment, which ranks in the middle of the unconditional default rates,
has a sizable and highly signi¯cant e®ect on the probability to default that
moves it down in the ranking to the second least repaid good, just after the
mobile phones. Overall, the estimates from the ¯rst two models reveal the
positive e®ect of mobile phones (0.030), electrical equipment (0.013), and
motorcycles (0.006), and the negative e®ect of furniture (-0.008) and new
cars (-0.022) on the default probability. Model I and II have con¯rmed that
the cross-good variation in the default rate, as captured by the reduced form
estimates of the good-speci¯c dummy variables ^ Gk
ij, persists even after con-
trolling for the observed individual-speci¯c and good-speci¯c characteristics
and for the potential selection bias due to credit rationing. We next explore
the estimation results of Model III in order to ¯nd out whether it is the
selection or the good e®ect which explains this residual variation.
Model III controls for the unobserved individual-speci¯c heterogeneity
due to sorting of people with di®erent default risk to di®erent types of goods
via the constructed individual goods-type indicators ^ Tk
i . Table 8 presents
the results from Model III. When controlling for the goods-type related indi-
vidual heterogeneity, the e®ect of the goods on the default rate, as measured
by the estimated good-speci¯c dummy variables ^ Gk
ij, which now capture the
true good e®ect, increases in magnitude only for the new cars (from -0.022 to
-0.025). The positive good e®ects of the electrical equipment and the mobile
phones are reduced from 0.013 to 0.011 and from 0.030 to 0.020 respectively.
The good e®ect of furniture disappears, while it decreases in signi¯cance and
even changes the sign for the motorcycles.
Summarizing the left half of Table 8 which shows the results for the true
good e®ect, we conclude that while new cars (and also somewhat motorcy-
cles) reduce the incentive to default, electrical equipment and, in particular,
mobile phones increase it. However, the signi¯cance and the magnitude of
17many of the estimated good-speci¯c dummy variables decline, suggesting
that it is the selection e®ect rather than the good e®ect that is captured by
the reduced-form indicators ^ Gk
ij, estimated in Model I and Model II.
Table 6: Model III - Preferred Model
Good e®ect Selection e®ect
New Cars -0.025¤¤ (0.003) 0.002 (0.005)
Kitchen Appl. 0.009 (0.008) -0.013¤¤ (0.003)
Furniture -0.005 (0.006) -0.011¤¤ (0.004)
Computers 0.001 (0.008) -0.010¤ (0.005)
Other Base Base -0.008¤¤ (0.003)
Electrical Eq. 0.011¤ (0.005) -0.007¤¤ (0.002)
Used Cars -0.008 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006)
Motorbikes -0.009y (0.005) 0.008y (0.004)
Mobile Phones 0.020¤¤ (0.007) -0.002 (0.003)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Ordered by unconditional default rates.
Marginal e®ects, standard errors in parenthesis.
The results for the selection e®ect, presented in the right half of the table,
con¯rm this as well. The previously documented negative e®ect of the fur-
niture is driven by selection: it is not the e®ect of furniture but rather the
kind of people who buy them that reduces their default rate. The marginal
e®ects of the goods-type individual heterogeneity show that selection among
di®erent types of goods is substantial and relevant for the observed variation
in the default rates: Individuals who buy kitchen appliances, furniture, as
well as computers, electrical equipment and Other goods are less likely to
default, while those who buy motorcycles have an above-average propensity
to default (although the e®ect is signi¯cant only at a 10 % level). Based
on the results from Model III, we conclude that the selection e®ect explains
most of the residual cross-good variation in the default rates.
We interpret the results as follows. The mobile phones may have a
positive good e®ect on the probability of default for two potential reasons.
First, they are easy to \hide", and therefore not as easy to repossess by
the debt-collector, so that the penalty for default is low. Second, they are
frequently stolen, often brake, and get quickly out of fashion, which are
all features that shorten their lifetime and increases their depreciation rate,
and therefore possibly reduce the incentives of the borrowers to repay them.
The negative e®ect of the new cars, on the other hand, may be explained
18by the high penalty of default given by the high risk of repossession. Cars
are registered and relatively easy to ¯nd and repossess and a well-developed
and e±cient second-hand market for the used cars increases the incentive to
repossess.
In case of the motorcycles, it seems that both the selection e®ect, which
increases the default probability, and the good e®ect, which reduces the
default probability, are at work. While not-repaying people seem to buy
motorcycles more often, the good has a positive e®ect on repayment, possibly
for similar reasons as cars. The two counteracting e®ects are also present for
electrical equipment, although with opposite signs. While repaying people
buy electrical equipment, electrical equipment makes individuals repay less
often, possibly for similar reasons as mobile phones.10
The results for the selection e®ect seem to be consistent with the com-
mon sense. It is predominantly young, single, risk-loving individuals, who
possibly don't have much property or reputation at risk, and don't bare
too many responsibilities, who buy motorcycles and who may also be more
prone to default. Individuals who buy kitchen appliances and furniture, on
the other hand, probably have, or are about to start, a family, are home-
owners, and lead a more steady life. It is likely that they are more risk-averse
and default is more costly for them, so that they tend to repay their loans
with an above-average probability.
To summarize, much of the cross-good variation in the default proba-
bility is explained by the selection e®ect rather than the e®ect of the good.
Individuals who buy kitchen appliances, furniture, and computers are less
likely to default their loans than an average person. The true \causal" good
e®ect explains the above-average default rates of the mobile phones and the
bellow-average default rates of the new cars. For motorcycles and the elec-
trical equipment, both e®ects seem to be at play and have opposite e®ects
on the propensity to default.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
The construction of the individual goods-type indicators Tk
i as well as the
identi¯cation of the selection versus the good e®ect hinge on the fact that
we observe multiple loan applications per individual, and more precisely,
individuals applying for multiple types of goods. Table 7 summarizes the
distribution of the goods information we have on individuals in our sample.
10 Electrical equipment is uneasy to repossess, and evolves at a rather high seed, making
the new good soon obsolete or out of fashion.
19While there are 62,145 individuals who we observe applying for only one
type of the good, there are 13,302 who have multiple goods information.
There are 11,379 individuals who applied for two types of goods, 1,697 in-
dividuals who applied for three types, 207 who applied for four types, and
19 individuals who applied for ¯ve types of goods during the given period.








The coe±cients of the individual goods-type indicators Tk
i in Model III
are identi¯ed o® the individuals who are observed to apply for credit for
more than one type of the good. If we observed only one loan application,
or more precisely - if we observed only single good information - per individ-
ual,11 the good-speci¯c dummy variables Gk
ij and the individual goods-type
indicators Tk
i could not be identi¯ed from each other. To test the validity
of our identi¯cation strategy as well as the robustness of our results, we re-
estimate Model III using only the accepted ¯rst contracts of individuals who
have applied for more than one type of good in the data. We also condition
on the multiple goods applications for the rejected ¯rst applications that are
used to control for the selection bias due to credit rationing.
The estimates, presented in Table 8, further strengthen the conclusion
that all the observed variation in the default rates across the goods is due to
selection. The only good e®ect left is that of new cars and mobile phones.
While the negative marginal e®ect of the new cars on the probability of
default stays more or less unchanged (at the value of -0.024), the good
e®ect of the mobile phones is reduced in both the magnitude (0.015) and
signi¯cance - it is signi¯cantly di®erent from the base category only at the 10
% level. The positive e®ect of electrical equipment and the negative e®ect of
11 Note, that the number of the di®erent types of the goods applied for (i.e. number
of T
k
i = 1 per individual) is equal or smaller than the number of the applications, as
individuals may apply multiple times for the same type of the good.
20Table 8: Sensitivity Results - Individuals with Multiple Good Information
Good e®ect Selection e®ect
New Cars -0.024¤¤ (0.008) 0.003 (0.007)
Kitchen Appl. -0.001 (0.009) -0.016¤¤ (0.004)
Furniture 0.001 (0.011) -0.010y (0.005)
Computers -0.010 (0.010) -0.010y (0.006)
Other Base Base -0.007y (0.004)
Electrical Eq. 0.009 (0.007) -0.005 (0.005)
Used Cars -0.010 (0.011) 0.001 (0.007)
Motorbikes 0.003 (0.009) 0.010y (0.006)
Mobile Phones 0.015y (0.009) -0.004 (0.005)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Ordered by unconditional default rates.
Marginal e®ects, standard errors in parenthesis.
motorcycles on the default probability disappear when only multiple good-
type applications are used for the estimation.
In addition, when we focus only on individuals with multiple goods ap-
plications, the observed variation in the default rates across goods due to
selection remains for ¯ve good categories, but disappears for the electri-
cal equipment. However, only the selection e®ect for kitchen appliances is
highly signi¯cant, while the other four categories are signi¯cant only at the
10 % signi¯cance level. This is not surprising, as conditioning on the multi-
ple goods observations, we are already selecting a particular group of loan
applicants who - given the acceptance process - are likely to be a more ho-
mogenous group and have a lower propensity to default. The results of the
sensitivity analysis suggest that except for the negative true good e®ect of
the new cars and the positive true good e®ect of the mobile phones, it is the
sorting of individuals to buying the di®erent goods on credit, which drives
the variation in the default rates across the di®erent types of goods. We
conclude that the individuals who buy kitchen appliances, furniture, com-
puters and Other goods on credit tend to have bellow-average propensity
to default, while individuals who buy on credit motorcycles are on average
more likely to default.
217 Policy Implications
As mentioned before, the features of the contracts do not vary with individ-
uals but only with the goods to be purchased on credit. They are posted
next to the product that is o®ered for purchase. Acceptance decision vary
with individual characteristics but also by the type of the good. This would
be the correct strategy for the Findomestic Banca if it is the good e®ect
that drives the cross-good variation in the default rates. In particular, by
setting the interest rates higher and the acceptance rules stricter for the
types of the goods with the high default rates, the bank may target similar
expected returns from the loans on di®erent types of goods. However, we
have shown that it is the selection e®ect rather than the good e®ect that
drives the cross-good variation in the default rates. This implies that the
type of the good being purchased on credit is only an imprecise indicator
of the repayment probability and that there is asymmetric information be-
tween the lender and the borrower, which leads to ine±ciencies under the
current arrangements. In particular, whenever individuals with high repay-
ment discipline buy on credit a good that has a high default rate, they
cross-subsidize, i.e. pay higher interest rate and face stricter acceptance
rules, the high default risk individuals who are the ones who typically buy
this good on credit. Individual-speci¯c contract features would yield higher
e±ciency in this context.
Our results also suggest that information from multiple loan applications
helps capture the individual heterogeneity that is correlated with the type
of the good purchased on credit. Previous applications may be therefore
employed by credit-granting companies as an additional information about
the individual's propensity to default. These can be used even without, or
prior to, observing the repayment behavior on past loans.
8 Conclusion
The default rates on instalment loans vary with the type of the good pur-
chased on credit. Loans to buy mobile phones and motorcycles have a much
higher risk of not being repaid than loans to buy furniture or kitchen ap-
pliances. The aim of this paper has been to explore whether the observed
variation is due to individuals with di®erent repayment behavior selecting
themselves to buy di®erent types of goods (the selection e®ect), or rather
due to speci¯c features of the goods that a®ect the incentive to repay in
di®erent ways (the good e®ect).
22The analysis uses data on instalment loans from a major Italian bank,
Findomestic Banca, during the period of 1995-1999 to estimate a model
of the probability of default. Multiple contract observations per individual
allow us to disentangle the selection e®ect from the good e®ect, and identify
which of the two predominates.
We ¯rst show that the variation in default rates across di®erent types
of goods persists even after conditioning on numerous contract-speci¯c and
individual-speci¯c characteristics in the model of the probability of default.
This remains true even when we take into account the potential bias from
the fact that the repayment behavior is observed only for the accepted ap-
plications. Using bivariate probit model with censoring, we estimate the de-
fault probability and the acceptance decision jointly, with the good-speci¯c
dummy variables present. The Usury Law enacted in the middle of the ob-
served period provides us with exclusion restrictions for the selection equa-
tion that describes the acceptance decision by the creditor. The estimated
good-speci¯c dummy variables measure the residual cross-good variation in
the probability of default. They are signi¯cant and sizable, suggesting that
the di®erences in the repayment behavior across types of goods exist even
when controlling for the observable characteristics and for the acceptance
decision.
To avoid endogenous attrition and the complex selection process of the
subsequent applications, and due to the lack of the exact timing information
on subsequent contracts in the data, we estimate the probability of default
using only accepted ¯rst contracts, employing rejected ¯rst applications to
control for the censoring. However, we use the subsequent applications per
individual to proxy the unobserved individual goods-type heterogeneity in
order to identify the selection e®ect and the good e®ect.
The preferred model, which includes both the good speci¯c dummy vari-
ables, as well as the individual goods-types indicators constructed from the
multiple contract observations, reveals that most of the cross-good variation
can be explained by selection. We conclude that it is di®erent types of peo-
ple, with di®erent unobserved propensity to default, that sort themselves to
di®erent types of goods, which drives the residual variation in the repayment
behavior across di®erent types of goods. In particular, the results suggest
that individuals who buy kitchen appliances, furniture and computers are on
average less likely to default on their loans, while those who buy motorcycles
are on average more likely to default on any type of loan.
The purely \causal" good e®ect on the default probability remains only
for new cars and mobile phones. The ¯rst is negative, suggesting that higher
threat of repossession may increase the incentives to repay a new car. The
23e®ect of mobile phones is positive; they are less likely to be repossessed,
and are strongly in°uenced by fashion, which increases their turnover and
therefore possibly reduces the borrowers' incentives to repay.
Using contract theory to interpret our results, we provide evidence that
asymmetric information is present in the consumer credit market under anal-
ysis, and that it is mostly in the form of adverse selection. Our ¯ndings
suggest that conditions of the loan and the acceptance decision should not
depend only on the type of the good being purchased but also on the goods-
related type of the individual who applies for the loan.
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25A De¯nition of the Key Variables
Left-hand-side Variables
default is a binary indicator whether a loan has been defaulted (equals 1 if de-
faulted and 0 otherwise). As some of the contracts are evaluated still before
the end of the contract, we use an indicator for a severe and a very severe
delay (more than ¯ve months) in the monthly payment, as viewed from the
perspective of the evaluation date.12
accept is a binary indicator whether a loan application has been accepted (equals
1 if accepted and 0 otherwise)
Individual Characteristics of the Loan Applicants / Borrowers
female is a binary indicator for gender (equals 1 if the individual who applied for
the loan is a woman)
age is individual's age (not available for rejected applications)
agesq is age squared and divided by 100 (not available for rejected applications)
married is a binary indicator of individual's marital status (equals 1 if married
and 0 otherwise)
Nkids is the number of dependent children the individual has
exp is the individual's work experience in a given profession
expsq is the work experience squared and divided by 100
hown is a binary indicator for home-ownership (equals 1 if an individual owns his
or her apartment or house and 0 otherwise)
mort is an indicator for mortgage (equals 1 if an individual has a mortgage and 0
otherwise)
Ies 2 is a binary indicator for employment status that equals 1 if an individual is
a public employees (private employee is a base category)
Ies 3 is a binary indicator for employment status that equals 1 if an individual is
a self-employed (private employee is a base category)
Ies 4 is a binary indicator for employment status that equals 1 if an individual
is retired (private employee is a base category)
Ies 5 is a binary indicator for employment status that equals 1 if an individual
has other employment status (private employee is a base category)
12 An informal discussion with another instalment loan lender revealed that contracts
on which a payment is delayed by more than three moths typically remain not repaid;
it is the third month of the delay that is critical for saving the loan, i.e. when it is still
worthwhile to act to get repaid.
26lnyd is the logarithm of the net annual household labor income expressed in year
2000 Euros
Ybank90 is a binary indicator for the tenure with the bank (equals 1 if an indi-
vidual was a Findomestic Banca customer before 1990)
Contract Characteristics - Terms of the Instalment Loan
interann is the annual interest rate (IRR) on the given loan, computed by the
author13
amountD is the size of the loan, (in hundreds) expressed in year 2000 Euros
amountDsq is the size of the loan squared, divided by 100
Nmonths is the length of the contract (in months)
priceD is the price of the good purchased, (in hundreds) expressed in year 2000
Euros
priceDsq is price of the good squared, divided by 100
insured is a binary indicator for insurance against seriously adverse events leading
to inability to repay (equals 1 the contract has been insured and 0 otherwise)
intwho1 is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the interest rate is paid by the
borrower (base category is when both the borrower and the dealer pays part
of the interest rate)
intwho3 is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the interest rate is paid by the
dealer (base category is when both the borrower and the dealer pays part of
the interest rate)
paybank is a binary indicator for the means of payments (equals 1 if payments
made by bank and 0 if payments made by postal order)
Iorig 2 - Iorig 4 are indicators for the origin of the contract, i.e. the dealer
who sells the good (there are four broad types of the dealers - Telematica,
Corriere, Fax Contratto, and Telefono - Telematica is the base category)
Geographical and Time Fixed E®ects
prov are binary indicators of the province of individual's residence (province ¯xed
e®ects)
year97-year99 are binary indicators for the year of the evaluation of the contract
(evaluation year ¯xed e®ects)
13The author is grateful to Stefan Hochguertel for providing her with the code to cal-
culate IRRs from Alessie et al. (2005)
27dy2-dy5 are binary indicators for the year of the inception of the contract (incep-
tion year ¯xed e®ects)
Exclusion Restrictions
pre ref is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the contract started before the Usury
Law was enacted and 0 otherwise
pre ref*amountD is the Usury Law dummy indicator interacted with the size of
the loan
pre ref*amountDsq is the Usury Law dummy indicator interacted with the squared
size of the loan
agency are binary indicators that describe the bank's agency in which the contract
was administered (agency ¯xed e®ect)
B Appendix - Full Estimation Results
This section contains the full estimation results for the three models and
the sensitivity analysis. In the models that use the bivariate probit model
to control for the selection bias due to the fact that only accepted loan
applications are observed, only the default equation and the estimate of the
cross-equation correlation of the error terms are presented. The estimates of
the selection equation (the acceptance decision) are subject to the privacy
restrictions of the data provider. They are available from the author under
strict con¯dentiality conditions.
Table 9: Full results - Model I
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
good==New Cars and motor homes -0.492¤¤ (0.089)
good==White Goods (kitchen appliances) 0.017 (0.047)
good==Furniture -0.131¤¤ (0.050)
good==Computers -0.011 (0.057)
good==Electr. equipment (Brown Goods) 0.182¤¤ (0.034)
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Ies 2 -0.060¤ (0.024)
Ies 3 0.364¤¤ (0.025)
Ies 4 -0.004 (0.041)













Iorig 2 -0.066 (0.078)
Iorig 3 -0.046 (0.034)
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Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
30Table 10: Model II
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : default
good==New Cars and motor homes -0.453¤¤ (0.091)
good==White Goods (kitchen appliances) 0.011 (0.047)
good==Furniture -0.122¤ (0.050)
good==Computers -0.007 (0.057)
good==Electr. equipment (Brown Goods) 0.177¤¤ (0.034)












Ies 2 -0.056¤ (0.024)
Ies 3 0.358¤¤ (0.025)
Ies 4 -0.014 (0.041)













Iorig 2 -0.065 (0.078)
Continued on next page...
31... table 10 continued
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
Iorig 3 -0.048 (0.034)
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Equation 2 : accept
Available from the author upon request






Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Table 11: Model III - Preferred Model
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : default
good==New Cars and motor homes -0.598¤¤ (0.127)
good==White Goods (kitchen appliances) 0.115 (0.092)
good==Furniture -0.072 (0.104)
good==Computers 0.021 (0.116)
good==Electr. equipment (Brown Goods) 0.149¤ (0.068)
good==(Used) Cars and motor homes -0.129 (0.116)
good==Motorbikes -0.142y (0.081)
good==Telecommunication 0.254¤¤ (0.072)
Tk for New Cars and motor homes 0.025 (0.075)
Tk for White Goods (kitchen appliances) -0.226¤¤ (0.062)
Tk for Furniture -0.176¤ (0.078)
Tk for Computers -0.157y (0.090)
Tk for Other -0.128¤ (0.051)
Tk for Electr. equipment (Brown Goods) -0.104¤¤ (0.035)
Continued on next page...
33... table 11 continued
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
Tk for (Used) Cars and motor homes 0.018 (0.081)
Tk for Motorbikes 0.101y (0.053)










Ies 2 -0.053¤ (0.024)
Ies 3 0.356¤¤ (0.025)
Ies 4 -0.010 (0.041)













Iorig 2 -0.066 (0.078)
Iorig 3 -0.050 (0.034)
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Equation 2 : accept
Available from the author upon request
Continued on next page...
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Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Table 12: Sensitivity Results - Individuals with Multiple
Good Information only
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : default
good==New Cars and motor homes -0.495y (0.273)
good==White Goods (kitchen appliances) -0.010 (0.129)
good==Furniture Units 0.008 (0.146)
good==Computers -0.155 (0.183)
good==Electr. equipment (Brown Goods) 0.119 (0.093)
good==(Used) Cars and motor homes -0.148 (0.204)
good==Motorbikes 0.043 (0.113)
good==Telecommunication 0.186y (0.100)
Tk for New Cars and motor homes 0.040 (0.088)
Tk for White Goods (kitchen appliances) -0.242¤¤ (0.076)
Tk for Furniture Units -0.157y (0.090)
Tk for Computers -0.150 (0.100)
Tk for Other -0.107 (0.067)
Tk for Electr. equipment (Brown Goods) -0.070 (0.063)
Tk for (Used) Cars and motor homes 0.013 (0.092)
Tk for Motorbikes 0.126y (0.069)
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Ies 2 -0.039 (0.056)
Ies 3 0.300¤¤ (0.062)
Ies 4 -0.013 (0.098)













Iorig 2 -0.258 (0.188)
Iorig 3 -0.084 (0.088)
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Equation 2 : accept
Available from the author upon request






Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
38